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The New Deal Lawyers. By Peter H. Irons. I Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xiv, 351. $27.50. 
Reviewed by Victor H Krame/'2 
Viewed against all of United States legal history, the four 
years covered in Professor Irons's book, The New .Deal Lawyers, 
are miniscule. Nevertheless, those were unusually important 
years and their history makes fascinating reading today. The 
book traces the history of three landmark New Deal agencies-
the National Industrial Recovery Administration, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Agency and the National Labor Relations Board-up 
to Roosevelt's second inauguration in 1937, shortly before the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor 
Relations Act.J The result, while not a complete legal history of 
the period, is some 300 pages of exhaustive detail, which gives a 
fascinating insight into some of the men whose accomplishments 
made this period so important.4 
In his Introduction, Professor Irons states that his "three case 
studies . . . explore in detail the litigation process."s He is con-
cerned, he says, with two related questions: 
[H)ow do constitutional test cases emerge from the crowded litigation dockets of 
federal regulatory agencies; and, second, can differences be discerned in the litiga-
tion strategies adopted by different agencies in the selection of test cases?6 
Having stated his objectives, Professor Irons proceeds to provide a 
thorough answer to his first question but leaves the second ques-
1. Visiting Professor of Legal Studies, University of Massachusetts. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. 
3. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
4. In his Preface, Professor Irons reminds readers he has necessarily "neglected the 
works of such infiuential New Deal Lawyers as Dean Acheson, David E. Lilienthal, James 
M. Landis and William 0. Douglas." P. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS xii (1982). Pro-
fessor Irons states in his Introduction that the work of 95 lawyers is discussed in the book. 
/d at 6. The work of 17 of these 95 are discussed in some detail. The 17 are: Thomas 
Corcoran, Homer Cummings, Thomas I. Emerson, Charles Fahy, Jerome N. Frank, Paul 
Freund, Lloyd Garrison, Milton Handler, Alger Hiss, Philip Levy, J. Warren Madden, 
Calvert Magruder, Stanley F. Reed, Blackwell Smith, Harold M. Stephens, Robert L. 
Stem, Charles Wyzanski. Since the author concentrated on only three New Deal agencies 
plus the Department of Justice, a more appropriate title for the book might be "Some New 
Deal Lawyers." 
5. P. IRONS, supra note 4, at 4. 
6. fd 
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tion only partially resolved. While Professor Irons does discuss 
differences between agencies in selecting cases, he is unable to de-
termine whether those differences actually affected the outcome of 
any of the cases. Rather, he concludes that the overwhelming tide 
of change, not their legal skills, gave the government's litigators 
their ultimate victories in the Supreme Court. In other words, 
President Roosevelt lost the Court-packing battle but won the 
cause; the majority of the members of the Supreme Court would, 
in the words of Chief Justice Hughes, no longer "shut our eyes to 
the plainest facts of our national life. "7 
A minor theme of the book, which is hammered home in con-
siderable detail, concerns conflict and tension between the agen-
cies and the Department of Justice in the management of 
litigation. The author's belief that this was an unusual phenome-
non may reflect his lack of experience as a government lawyer.s 
The conflict, which in the early years of the New Deal made life 
miserable for lawyers in both the Department and the agencies,9 
continued with vigor and indeed continues down to the present 
day. This phenomonon-the fight for control of federal litiga-
tion-is a fascinating one that defies completely satisfactory ex-
planation. To undertake an explanation would be worthy of a 
separate book. 
7. Id at 287 quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 41 (1937). 
8. Professor Irons's extraordinary career is set out in the Preface at x-xii. Born in 
1940, he became active in the anti-draft movement while in college and ultimately served 
26 months in federal prisons. Then followed four years of graduate study in political sci-
ence, which generated his intense interest in the New Deal. After becoming friendly with 
Alger Hiss, Irons entered Harvard Law School in 1975, but has never practiced law. Cur-
rently he is visiting Professor of Legal Studies at the University of Massachusetts. 
9. The prevailing attitude of the Ivy League law school graduates toward the law-
yers in the Department of Justice in the early and middle Thirties is well summed up by 
Thomas Emerson in a passage Irons quotes at 228: 
The Justice Department . . . was "the most political branch of the administra-
tion, and . . . its staff was filled with people who were more or less failures as 
lawyers or else ancient bureaucratic types. They had no particular interest in the 
New Deal .... " 
Professor Irons refers at great length to a long memorandum by W.B. Watson Snyder, 
an, attorney with the Department of Justice, prepared for Assistant Attorney General Ste-
phens, reporting on the instances in which the lawyers employed by the Petroleum Admin-
istrative Board had overstepped their authority and worked at cross purposes with the 
Justice Department. P. IRONS, supra note 4, at 63. Snyder recommended that the Attorney 
General require the Board to seek authorization from the Justice Department before prose-
cuting code violations. Stephens rejected Snyder's advice though he shared his attitudes 
toward lawyers at the Board. Meanwhile, Secretary of the Interior Ickes confided to his 
diary that "hardly anyone has any respect for the standing and ability of the lawyers" at 
the Justice Department. Id at 65. 
This reviewer knew and worked with Snyder in the Antitrust Division in the late Thir-
ties and early Forties. He was a lovely person, a reasonably good investigator, and a law-
yer of limited judgment. Had Professor Irons had the opportunity to work with Mr. 
Snyder, he might not have placed so much emphasis on Snyder's reports. 
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Most recently, former President Carter and his first Attorney 
General, Griffin Bell, tried to do something about the conflict over 
control of federal litigation. Carter appointed a study group 
whose tasks included a study of federal legal representation. 10 
That group identified many problems inherent in the existing sys-
tem by which the attorneys in the Department of Justice battled 
the agency lawyers for control over federallitigation.u The study 
group submitted to the President a number of "options" for 
change; some were adoptedi2 but none appears to have made 
much difference. 
With the decline of federal regulation under President Rea-
gan the problem may be less acute. But under President Carter, 
the dramatic increase in government lawyering overwhelmed the 
Justice Department's litigation capacity. Although the numbers 
are geometrically greater, the problem in the 1980s is remarkably 
similar to that in the 1930s. The following passage, although 
describing the conflict in 1933-35, applies equally to the conflict as 
it exists today, or at least as it existed under President Carter: 
Since its establishment in 1870, the Department had fought a back-and-fonh bat-
tle with the cabinet departments and independent agencies for control of federal 
litigation. In essence the argument revolved around the respective merits of cen-
tralization and expertise; the Justice Department would claim that the govern-
ment must speak in court with one voice ... while the agencies countered that 
their lawyers best understood the statutes and the details of their cases.l3 
As a matter of logic and symmetry in organization charts, a 
very strong case can be made for centralization in the Department 
of Justice. But as is so often the case, the facts fly in the face of 
logic and symmetry. The volume of litigation to which the United 
States is a party staggers the mind; there are scores of thousands of 
cases pending in which the government is involved.I4 The De-
partment simply does not have enough lawyers to take charge or 
even supervise this body of litigation. Is 
10. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DATA ON THE FEDERAL LEGAL 
SYSTEM, PRESIDENT's REORGANIZATION PROJECT 7 (January 1979) (available in Minne-
sota Law School Library). 
II. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SYNOPSIS OF DRAFT OPTIONS, FED· 
ERAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION STUDY, PREsiDENT'S REORGANIZATION PROJECT (March 
24, 1978) (unpublished). 
12. See Exec. Order No. 12146, 3 C.F.B. 409 (1980). 
13. P. IRONS, supra note 4, at 41 (footnote omitted). 
14. On June 30, 1982 there were 57,967 civil actions pending in the U.S. District 
Courts in which the U.S. was a party. See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OF-
FICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 226 (1982). 
15. Although there were about 55,000 employees in the Justice Department in 1981, 
only 4,145 or about 7.7 percent of these were lawyers. See JUSTICE MANAGEMENT DIVI· 
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The book's great strength lies in its detailed, vivid pictures of 
the lawyers behind the agencies. For example, Professor Irons has 
a discerning eye for the prejudices and inferiority complexes of 
lawyers in the New Deal days. Thus, he spends several pages dis-
cussing the contrasting attitudes of Nathan Margold, Jerome 
Frank and Charles Fahy toward employing Jewish lawyers on 
their legal staffs.I6 Frank, who was then Solicitor of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture, reported in a memorandum to Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry Wallace: 
[T]here are only two Jews on the staff and I have recommended two others. The 
total staff will be something over thirty, and I do not think that five Jews out of 
this total would be a disproportionately large number. Indeed I have taken such 
care to discourage Jewish applicants that I have gained the reputation among my 
non-Jewish friends, at Columbia, Yale, and elsewhere, of being anti-Semitic. At 
least half a dozen very able lawyers have been rejected by me on this ground 
17 
In contrast to Frank's perception, Adlai Stevenson II, who was 
then of Frank's staff, observed in a letter to his wife that "there is 
a little feeling" in the AAA "that the Jews are getting too promi-
nent." He continued by noting that Frank "has none of the racial 
characteristics" of the other Jewish lawyers who, although "indi-
vidually smart and able, are more racial."Is Nathan Margold, So-
licitor of the Interior Department, was also concerned that he 
would "lay myself open to the charge which is almost certain to be 
laid against me, if I choose too many Jewish men", and conse-
quently, rejected most of the Jewish lawyers recommended to him 
by Frankfurter.I9 In contrast, the general counsel for the NLRB, 
Charles Fahy, showed no reluctance to hire Jewish lawyers. J. 
Warren Madden, Chairman of the NLRB, later recalled that the 
NLRB was a haven for ''young men who had made excellent 
records in law school but who, on account of their race, a great 
many of them being Jewish, did not have good opportunities"2o 
for careers in private practice. Now that large numbers of Jewish 
lawyers are accepted both in the big firms and in government 
agencies, these New Deal attitudes may seem quaint if not repug-
nant; nevertheless, they provide an interesting insight into the atti-
tudes of the top lawyers in New Deal agencies.21 
SION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, EMPLOYMENT fACT BOOK FOR THE PERIOD JANU· 
ARY I, 1981 TO DECEMBER 31, 1981 6, 14 (1982). 
16. P. IRONS, supra note 4, at 60, 126-28, 237. 
17. Jd at 127. 
18. Jd at 128. 
19. Jd at 60. 
20. Jd at 237. Fahy's father was a Catholic, but his mother was Jewish. Jd at 234. 
21. Even Thurman Arnold, who worked closely with Abe Fortas both on the Yale 
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The New Deal Lawyers is thoroughly and carefully 
researched. Wide use is made of the oral history collections at 
Cornell and Columbia, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, the 
National Archives and the Manuscript Division of the Library of 
Congress.22 In addition, the author interviewed several of the 
New Deal lawyers including Alger Hiss, Thomas Emerson, 
Charles Fahy and Thomas Corcoran.23 Out of the interview with 
Emerson came a wonderful appellate courtroom story. Charles 
Fahy, then General Counsel of the Labor Board, was arguing the 
Greyhound24 case before the Third Circuit. The panel consisted 
of: 
[T)hree judges of advanced age and diminished ability: Chief Judge Buffington 
was eighty-one and had been on the federal bench since 1892; his two colleagues, 
Oliver Dickinson and J. Whitaker Thompson, were comparative youngsters at 
seventy-nine and seventy-five. Tom Emerson, who accompanied Fahy to Phila-
delphia for the argument, recalled the judges "had absolutely no idea of the con-
stitutional issues involved." The normally unfiappable Fahy was incredulous 
when Judge Buffington interrupted him: after sending a clerk for a copy of the 
Constitution, the judge thumbed through it and asked Fahy, "Does this case in-
volve Indian tribes?" No, the puzzled Fahy answered. "Does it involve trade 
with foreign nations?" No, again. ''Then it must be commerce between the 
states," Buffington concluded triumphantly.25 
From Irons's interview with Leon Keyserling comes another 
gem. Keyserling was then legislative aide to Senator Wagner and 
Charles Wyzansk.i was Solicitor of the Labor Department. These 
two brilliant and arrogant lawyers had a bitter dispute in 1934-35 
over the bill that would become the National Labor Relations Act. 
Professor Irons described this controversy: 
Labor Department Solicitor Charles Wyzanski, cautious on legal questions and 
institutionally loyal, had helped to torpedo Wagner's Labor Disputes Act in 1934 
and drafted Public Resolution 44 to displace it. Keyserling acidly recalled 
faculty and in the Department of Agriculture in the early New Deal days and later founded 
a famous firm with him, was well aware of the problem of the Jewish lawyer in the thirties. 
In a 1936 letter to Professor Leon Green, apparently concerning qualified candidates for a 
law faculty, Arnold, then at Yale, wrote concerning Fortas: 
[H]e is under a handicap here because he is a Jew and they are paying him a 
miserable salary .... He is married to a Gentile, a most attractive girl who will 
fit in anywhere. He is not Jewish in appearance and if his name were not Abe 
Fonas, I do not think anyone would know he was a Jew. 
VOLTAIRE AND THE COWBOY: THE LETTERS OF THURMAN ARNOLD 222 (G. Gressley ed. 
1977). 
22. P. IRoNs, supra note 4, at 301, 334. 
23. Id at 334. 
24. NLRB v. Pa. Greyhound Lines, 91 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1937). The three judges who 
participated in the decision were Buffington, Dickinson (who was then on the District 
Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania) and Biggs, not Thompson. Biggs dissented 
in pan. 
25. P. Irons, supra note 4, at 256 (footnotes omitted). 
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Wyzanski's "look of satisfaction" when the resolution passed "and he thought 
that the Wagner bill was as dead as a coffin nail." When it turned out that 
Wyzanski's approach had expired and Wagner revived his bill, "Wyzanski did all 
he could to ruin the bill," Keyserling charged.26 
Admittedly, as the reader plows through hundreds of pages 
relating to almost forgotten cases of 50 years ago, he may tend to 
weary of such exhaustive detai1.27 Recollected in its entirety, how-
ever, the book left this reader with the satisfying feeling that he 
had learned something about his older colleagues of almost two 
generations ago that he hadn't appreciated at the time: they were, 
on the whole, an extraordinarily able bunch. The proof is in their 
work, which is well described in The New Deal Lawyers. 
26. ld at 230 (footnotes omitted). 
27. This reader found the following two errors in details in the book: 
Robert L. Stem, who is given a good deal of credit in the book for developing the 
arguments which ultimately changed the Supreme Court's mind on the reach of federal 
power over commerce, see id at 294-98, is described as having started his New Deal career 
with the Petroleum Administrative Board and then having moved to the Solicitor General's 
office in the Department of Justice. ld at 48. Actually, his move there was delayed for 
several years which he spent in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 
On page 298, the author states that Hugh Cox was in the Solicitor General's office. 
Cox held various high posts in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice from 
1935 to 1943; in the latter year he becam' Assistant Attorney General in charge of the 
newly-created War Division; later that year he became Assistant Solicitor General. 35 
WHo's WHo IN AMERICA 504 (1968-69). That office, at least after 1942, had nothing to do 
with the Solicitor General. Its title was subsequently changed to Office of Legal Counsel. 
(Cox's name was inadverdently omitted from the index. See P. IRONS, supra note 4, at 
343). 
